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I. INTRODUCTION
In Louisiana the touchstone of an oil and gas lessee's obligations
is Article 122 of the Mineral Code, which provides in part:
A mineral lessee is not under a fiduciary obligation to his
lessor, but he is bound to perform the contract in good faith
and to develop and operate the property leased as a reasonably
prudent operator for the mutual benefit of himself and his
lessor ....
This article codifies jurisprudential principles recognizing that the
principal consideration or return to the lessor under the ordinary oil
and gas lease is a royalty or fractional portion of the minerals produced
by the lessee. Accordingly, the lessor's return from the contract is
dependent upon production occurring from the land. From this premise,
the courts have held that the very nature of the agreement implies that
the parties contemplate that the lessee will do whatever is customary
and reasonable to discover and exploit the mineral deposits that might
exist under the leased premises.
Much of the early litigation involving the lessee's implied obligation
was concerned with the extent to which the lessee was required to drill
additional wells on the premises to fully develop reservoirs which had
been discovered. Before spacing, unitization, and the regulation of drill-
ing became commonplace, the unlimited rule of capture prevailed. The
rule caused lessors to demand the drilling of more and more wells on
their premises in order to drain the reservoir and get as great of a
proportion of the production as they could. A lessee who was satisfied
that the existing wells would adequately drain the premises, or who
perhaps owned interests in wells on adjacent premises, would be reluctant
to spend more money on drilling merely to increase the royalty owner's
income. The courts, in attempting to reach some satisfactory resolution
of the matter, ultimately concluded that for the lessor to succeed in
such a case, he would have to demonstrate that "a prudent operator"
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would drill additional wells. In order to satisfy this burden of proof,
the lessor was generally obliged to prove that the lessee had failed to
drill wells on the premises that would be both productive and profitable.
The question then arose as to whether the lessee was obligated to
explore the remaining and unproductive portions of the leased premises.'
The courts tended to hold that the lessee did have such an obligation,
but then applied the same test to measure the extent of his obligation
as was applied to the obligation to develop reservoirs that had been
discovered-the lessor had to prove that the lessee had failed to drill
a well that a prudent operator would have drilled, i.e., one that would
have been both productive and profitable. This requirement ordinarily
presented the lessor with an insurmountable burden of proof, since the
well necessarily would be a "wildcat" or exploratory one. The odds
that such a well will be successful are always small and a proper
evaluation of whether an operator should drill such a well involves fairly
sophisticated economic and geological analyses which few judges are
competent to make, even with the assistance of expert testimony. Re-
quiring the lessor to prove by a preponderance of evidence that such
a well would be successful and profitable rendered the obligation almost
meaningless.
The lessor's burden in proving that his lessee had imprudently failed
to drill a well to an as yet undiscovered reservoir was heightened, as
a practical matter, by another equally difficult obstacle. All jurisdictions
1. The industry very early developed leases stipulating that the payment of rentals
permits the lessee to delay the onset of his obligation to develop the property. Thus,
before production was obtained during the primary term, the payment of such delay
rentals permitted the lessee to refrain from action, at least in the absence of drainage.
After production, however, most leases were silent as to the continuing obligations of
the lessee. This pattern generally still prevails in most oil and gas lease forms. Under
such leases, the implied obligations only have relevancy after the lessee has discovered
and is producing oil and gas from the premises. In recent years the so-called "Pugh"
clause has become a common addition to leases. This clause essentially permits the lessee
to pay a rental in lieu of drilling on non-productive areas of the lease-but limits the
lessee's rights to continue the lease as to such areas to a specific term. The arrangement
is generally popular with both lessors and lessees because it provides the former with the
assurance that unless his land is brought into production within a limited period, it will
be freed from the lease. The lessee is provided with the assurance that he will not be
embroiled in controversy about whether he is proceeding to explore at a satisfactory pace
and lends certainty to his plans by giving him a fixed period after he discovers oil and
gas to develop the premises. In essence, the Pugh clause merely extends the primary term
of the lease as to the undeveloped areas, if the lessee succeeds in developing a part of
the premises during the primary term. The contention encountered from time to time that
the lessee still has the implied obligation to develop areas during periods in which he is
paying so called "Pugh rentals" represents a complete misunderstanding of their nature
and purpose-and is equivalent to contending that one has the implied obligation to drill
during the primary term when delay rentals may be paid in lieu of drilling to perpetuate
the term of the lease.
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originally held that an oil and gas lease was a form of interest in real
property. This holding led them also to conclude that the interest was
essentially indivisible. If the court found that the lessee was in default
of his obligations, it seemed necessary to cancel or dissolve the lease
in its entirety. Since the obligation to explore did not arise until after
the lessee had discovered and was producing oil or gas from somewhere
on the premises, cancellation of the lease would do more than put the
parties back into the position they had occupied before the lease was
granted-it would transfer to the lessor the benefits of the development
that had already been obtained by the lessee at substantial risk and
expense. In such cases, the lessor's claim that the lease should be
cancelled because the lessee had failed to drill additional wells invariably
was met with the response by the lessee that the lessor was really
motivated by a desire to obtain the benefits of the development that
had already occurred. The lessee would then argue that the fact that
he had already discovered and developed one or more reservoirs proved
both his good faith and desire to develop the premises. After all, the
lessee's share of production is six or seven times that of the lessor.
Why would he not drill additional wells if in fact they would be
productive and profitable?
In effect, in the early actions, the court was faced with depriving
the lessee of the benefits of his development by substituting its judgment
for his as to the propriety of drilling what were essentially wildcat or
highly risky wells. There was and still is a justified reluctance on the
part of the courts to do that except in the clearest of cases. Lessors,
generally speaking, were so unsuccessful in their efforts that some courts
and commentators doubted whether such an obligation really existed.'
2. This contention was made in spite of the fact that the emergence of the delay
rental provisions in the modem lease form could be directly traced to the courts' insistence
that in their absence a lessee was obligated to promptly start exploration and development
of the premises. See Moses, The Evolution And Development Of The Oil And Gas Lease,
2d Annual Inst. On Oil & Gas L. & Tax'n I (1951) for an excellent discussion of the
development of the modern lease. The state of the jurisprudence relating to the obligation
to explore is rather well chronicled in Williams and Meyers' well known treatise. Williams
and Meyers argue for an interpretation of the jurisprudence that is somewhat more
favorable to the lessor than the writer believes is justified. They also note that their views
as to the existence of the covenant and its parameters are not shared by all, citing
Professor Brown's treatise as one that argues against the existence of the obligation. The
Williams and Meyers treatise also contains a rather complete bibliography of the articles
and treatises that deal with the subject. See 5 H. Williams and C. Meyers, Oil and Gas
Law, § 841 (1990). For a fairly representative cross section of modern cases dealing with
the subject from other jurisdictions, see Reynolds v. Smith, 231 Ark. 566, 331 S.W.2d
112 (1960); Skelly Oil Co. v. Skoggins, 231 Ark. 357, 329 S.W.2d 424 (1959); Mitchell
v. Amerada Hess Corp., 638 P.2d 441 (Okla. 1981), and Sun Exploration and Production
Co. et al. v. Jackson, 783 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. 1989).
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II. THE NATURE OF THE OBLIGATION To EXPLORE THE PREMISES
Some of the difficulty in interpreting the jurisprudence in Louisiana
stems from the fact that the Louisiana courts have sometimes referred
to the lessee's obligation to "develop" as the obligation to do what is
necessary to profitably mine mineral deposits that have been discovered,
i.e. to "develop known mineral deposits." At other times the term has
been used to refer to the matter under consideration, i.e. "the obligation
to develop or explore the premises." Although the two spring from the
same source-the obligation to act as a prudent operator-and therefore
are but different aspects of the same obligation, they do involve different
considerations that arise from the nature of the industry, the state of
geological knowledge, and the occurrence of oil and gas itself. Thus,
the two obligations may be conveniently considered separately.' For
convenience, the writer will refer to the obligation under consideration
as that to explore the premises, and the obligation to develop (or to
mine) discovered deposits as the obligation to develop existing reservoirs.
The lessor who claims that his lessee has inadequately developed a
particular reservoir or field from which he is producing must ordinarily
still show that the lessee should have drilled additional wells on the
premises, since that is about all one can do to further develop a field
after it has been discovered.4 On the other hand, the Louisiana courts
have rather clearly recognized that such a test is inappropriate to measure
the obligation of the lessee to explore the non-producing portions of
the lease for undiscovered reservoirs.' This is not to say that it ultimately
3. "As noted, Williams and Meyers characterize the covenant of further exploration
as being separate from the covenant of reasonable development. This is a defensible view.
However, historically in Louisiana the obligation of further exploration can be viewed as
an evolutionary offshoot of the obligation of reasonable development. See Carter v.
Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 213 La. 1028, 36 So.2d 26 (La. 1948). Although the
jurisprudence does not make a clear distinction between the obligation of further explo-
ration and the obligation of reasonable development, the distinction nevertheless exists."
(Citations omitted.) Comments to Mineral Code article 122.
4. "The lessor must prove ... that a reasonable, prudent operator would conduct
additional drilling operations in the productive formation." Comments to Mineral Code
article 122. Even that statement is not unqualifiedly true-in every situation, the ultimate
question is: what would a prudent operator do under the circumstances? For example,
the courts have long recognized that a failure to utilize more modern production techniques
to develop existing reservoirs might constitute a breach of the lease. See Waseco Chemical
and Supply v. Bayou State Oil, 371 So. 2d 305 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979). Recently the
courts have also recognized that, when appropriate, a lessee is obligated to seek unitization
of the premises with adjacent lands as an alternative to drilling on the land itself. See
Pierce v. GoldKing Properties, Inc., 396 So. 2d 528 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981).
5. A good example of the confusion in the concepts is found in a student article
in the Tulane Law Review, Comment, Implied Covenants in Louisiana Mineral Leases as
Affected by Conservation Legislation, 27 Tul. L. Rev. 353 (1953). Unfortunately the article
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may not be necessary to drill a well. The process by which the industry
goes about looking for oil and gas deposits involves many steps and
requires considerable skill and the expenditure of considerable sums of
money before the decision to drill can be made. The oil company that
obligates itself to develop land for its mineral value must impliedly be
promising not only to mine the minerals that it finds but also to do
those things necessary to determine where the minerals are located.
III. GENESIS OF THE OBLIGATION
The case of Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co. 6 first articulated the legal
foundations for the implied obligations of the lessee. In that case, the
court noted that oil and gas leases are generally silent as to any express
obligation of the lessee to drill or produce from the premises and simply
provide that the lease will continue so long as the lessee produces oil
or gas. The court then held that the lessee, nevertheless, had an affir-
mative, albeit implied, obligation to diligently search for and produce
minerals from the premises. The silence of the lease as to the express
details of the obligation was explained on the grounds that mineral
deposits occur in such a variety of situations and are so diverse in
nature as to make it impossible to predict what development the premises
might require, or to lay down rules as to what will, in any given
situation, constitute reasonable conduct. Accordingly, the lease leaves it
to implication that the lessee will do what is prudent under the circum-
stances in light of the objectives of the parties.
Louisiana courts have expressly recognized the accuracy of the court's
perceptions in Brewster and consistently have refused to lay down specific
rules or establish definite regulations as to what constitutes prudent
conduct by the lessee, not only because it is impractical to do so, but
because fixed rules would define the obligations of the lessee when the
parties themselves have refused to do so, and impose upon them a
bargain which they have not made. Thus, in Carter v. Arkansas Louis-
iana Gas Co., 7 the court, expressly relying upon Brewster, said:
Whether in any given case the lessee has sufficiently devel-
oped the leased property pursuant to the rule set out above, is
a question of fact which must be resolved by a consideration
was rather uncritically cited by the second circuit in Vetter v. Morrow, 361 So. 2d 898
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1978), as demonstrating the existence of a number of mechanical
"factors" one could use to determine whether a lessee has prudently developed the premises.
Every supreme court decision on the matter, however, has expressly refused to catalog
or define what it is that the lessee must do and has insisted that it is a matter that must
be determined in each case, in light of the circumstances prevailing in that case.
6. 140 F. 801 (8th Cir. 1905).
7. 213 La. 1028, 36 So. 2d 26 (1948).
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of the facts and circumstances shown in the particular case.,
This principle has now been legislatively confirmed by Article 122
of the Mineral Code, previously quoted.
IV. THE DINvSIBILITY OF THE Om AND GAS LEASE
In Louisiana an oil and gas lease essentially is a contract. 9 Modern
forms of lease used in Louisiana customarily contain a number of
provisions that indicate that the parties consider the lessee's obligations
to be divisible.' 0 As a result of these factors, the Louisiana Supreme
Court began to grant partial cancellation of oil and gas leases when
the breach by the lessee did not directly involve a failure to properly
and adequately produce reservoirs that he had discovered. In the first
case to do so, Carter v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co.," the court really
did not directly address the issue of divisibility. The lease contained the
customary provision that if it was cancelled, the lessee would be entitled
to retain an area around each producing well. The lessor only sought
cancellation of the part of the premises outside of such areas, honoring
the clause. The lessee's argument that the lease could not be partially
cancelled in that manner was met with the rather sensible response that
the lessor only sought cancellation in accordance with the agreement of
8. Id. at 1035, 36 So. 2d at 28. In the Carter case, the court expressly approved
Justice VanDevanter's characterization of the lessee's obligations in the Brewster case:
"whatever, in the circumstances, would be reasonably expected of operators in ordinary
circumstances, having regard to the interests of both lessor and lessee, is what is required."
Wier v. Grubb the court stated that "[wle recognize the difficulty of laying down any
comprehensive rule ... the merits of each case must be determined according to its
particular circumstances." 228 La. 254, 82 So. 2d I (1955). See Sohio Petroleum Co. et
al. v. Miller, 237 La. 1013, 112 So. 2d 695 (1959). "The law of this case, . . . is well
settled, and hence the issue to be resolved is purely one of fact." See also Middleton v.
California Company, 237 La. 1039, 112 So. 2d 704 (1959) ("This obligation ... will
vary with the circumstances of each case. . . ."); Frazier v. Justiss Mears Oil Co., 391
So. 2d 485 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980) ("The question of reasonable development is a factual
issue peculiar to each case .... ); Dawes v. Hale, 421 So. 2d 1208 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1982), ("Whether the lessee has sufficiently developed the leased property is a question
of fact . . . ."); Allen v. Home, 478 So. 2d 671 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985).
9. "A mineral lease is a contract by which the lessee is granted the right to explore
for and produce minerals .... Mineral Code article 114.
10. Such leases commonly contain provisions permitting the payment of delay rentals
on only part of the premises; giving the lessee the right to abandon part of the premises;
providing that in the event of termination or forfeiture the lessee may retain his rights
around then producing wells; providing that assignment of all of the rights in a given
area to another will divide the lease; and stipulating that in certain cases unitization will
perpetuate the lease only as to the unitized area, all of which indicate that the parties
believe that the lessee's rights and obligations can be geographically divided or reduced.
II. 213 La. 1028, 36 So. 2d 26 (1948).
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the parties-implying that the lessee was not required to retain the rest
if it did not want to do so,' since the lease also provided that the lessee
could abandon the lease in whole or in part at any time.
Whether the court could fashion a remedy for breach by partially
cancelling the lease without the lessor's consent was presented in the
case of Eota Realty Company v. Carter Oil Co.' 2 The court, relying
upon statements in its earlier Carter opinion to the effect that an oil
and gas lease was divisible, held that the failure to develop part of the
premises justified dissolving the lease only as to that part. The principle
became accepted and is codified in Article 142 of the Mineral Code in
the following terms:
A mineral lease may be dissolved partially or in its entirety.
A decree of partial dissolution may be made applicable to a
specified portion of land, to a particular stratum or strata, or
to a particular mineral or minerals.
The determination that the ordinary oil and gas lease is viewed by
the parties as being divisible had the effect of neutralizing what was in
fact the lessee's strongest argument in the exploration cases--that can-
cellation would deprive him of the development he had brought about
merely because he was unwilling to take on what was admittedly a
highly and speculative venture-and opened the door for the courts to
give a more expansive construction to the lessee's obligations. The courts
did not hesitate to do so.
V. REcoONITION IN LOUISIANA OF THE OBLIOATION To EXPLORE
Carter not only presaged the principle of divisibility, but also laid
the foundations for, and caused some of the confusion in, the subsequent
development of the principles now regulating the lessee's obligation to
explore the non-productive portions of the leased premises. In Carter
the court said:
The law of this state is well settled that the main consid-
eration of a mineral lease is the development of the leased
premises for minerals, and that the lessee must develop with
reasonable diligence or give up the contract; further, that as to
what constitutes development and reasonable diligence on the
part of the lessee must conform to, and be governed by, what
is expected of persons of ordinary prudence under similar cir-
cumstances and conditions, having due regard for the interest
of both contracting parties.' 3
12. 225 La. 790, 74 So. 2d 30 (1954).
13. 213 La. at 1034, 36 So. 2d at 28.
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The court thus squarely recognized that the lessee has an affirmative
obligation to "develop" the leased premises with reasonable diligence.
It is also clear from the context in which the expression was used by
the court, as well as from later interpretations of the case by the court
itself, that the term "develop" has a broader meaning than only drilling
clearly profitable wells. Rather, to reasonably develop the premises im-
plies that the lessee will do those things that an operator knowledgeable
of the industry, having adequate resources, and actively interested in
producing oil and gas would do from time to time during the term of
the lease to determine the probable occurrence of mineral deposits on
the leased premises and to bring those deposits into commercial pro-
duction in due course and when it reasonably appears that to do so
would be profitable.
VI. WHAT DOES THE OBLIGATION To EXPLORE ENTAIL?
In support of his argument that the lessee had failed to properly
develop the premises, the lessor in Carter offered the testimony of
another operator who declared that he had made an investigation of
the mineral potential of the undeveloped parts of the premises and that
he was so convinced of their- value that he would in fact drill a well
on the premises if they were leased to him. On the other hand, the
lessee essentially denied that any obligation to explore the non-productive
portion of the premises in fact existed. The court described the lessee's
stance as follows:
The record does not disclose that defendant has any present or
future plans to develop this property further, and the evidence
convinces us, as it did the trial court, that defendant has no
intention of making any further development.
Defendant argues that ... defendant is not required to drill
exploratory wells on the undeveloped portion of the tract ...
or, in other words, that the drilling of any additional wells on
the property described in the lease would constitute exploration
and not development.
In the 10 years or more during which this defendant has
had the property under lease, . . . no effort has been made and
no steps taken to develop the [undeveloped part of the] property
in any way ... nor has defendant conducted geophysical work
or made tests of any nature in an effort to ascertain whether
production could be had therefrom. 4
In holding for the plaintiff, the court first noted that the possible
presence of oil and gas under the non-developed portion of the premises
14. Id. at 1032-37, 36 So. 2d at 27.29.
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was borne out both by the willingness of another operator to drill a
well and the testimony of geologists that oil and gas were frequently
encountered on both sides of faults of the kind that existed under the
lessor's land. The court then held that the defendant's refusal to take
any steps to investigate the mineral potential of the property was contrary
to its obligation to act as a prudent operator and was cause for can-
cellation of the lease. In doing so, the court analogized the lessee's
actions to an abandonment of the lease as to those premises:
The law of this state is well settled that the main consid-
eration of a mineral lease is the development of the leased
premises for minerals, and that the lessee must develop with
reasonable diligence or give up the contract; further, that as to
what constitutes development and reasonable diligence on the
part of the lessee must conform to, and be governed by, what
is expected of persons of ordinary prudence under similar cir-
cumstances and conditions, having due regard for the interest
of both contracting parties. Pipes v. Payne et al., 156 La. 791,
101 So. 144; Stubbs et al. v. Imperial Oil & Gas Co., 164 La.
689, 114 So. 595; Logan v. Tholl Oil Co., Inc., et al., 189 La.
645, 180 So. 473. See also Merrill, The Law Relating to Cov-
enants Implied in Oil and Gas Leases, 2d Ed., sec. 122, p. 280,
sec. 123, p. 284; 2 Summers, Oil and Gas, Perm.Ed., sec. 414,
p. 370.
Although in the case of Fox Petroleum Co. et al. v. Booker
et al., 123 Oki. 276, 253 P. 33, 38, the lease was cancelled on
the theory of abandonment, what was said in that case regarding
the implied obligation of the lessee to develop the premises is
pertinent here:
"The principle, as we understand it, is that develop-
ment of every part of the lease is an implied condition.
Therefore, whether the undeveloped portion be a single
tract remote from the rest, or a considerable portion of a
very large tract, . . . or the east one hundred acres of a
tract of 160, it is an implied condition that the lessee will
test every part." 5
VII. AMPLIFICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE LESSEE'S
DUTY To EXPLORE.
Notwithstanding the justifiable reluctance of the courts to enunciate
particular rules to determine when a lessee has complied with his ob-
15. Id. at 1034-38, 36 So. 2d at 28-29.
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ligation to explore, there are a number of general principles concerning
the obligation that can be gleaned from the jurisprudence since Carter
and that at least establish some parameters for the obligation. These
principles can be summarized as follows:
A. The obligation to act prudently does not require the lessee to
incur expenses or take actions that a prudent operator similarly situated
would not undertake, or that are not profitable to himself, even though
they might benefit the lessor. The lessee is not a fiduciary-the matter
is one of the performance of the contract in good faith and the purpose
of the contract is economic exploitation of the minerals. '6
Article 122 expressly recognizes that the lessee is not a fiduciary for
the lessor. He is not obligated to incur expenses or engage in activities
that a prudent operator similarly situated would not undertake, or that
are not profitable to himself even though they might redound to the
benefit of the lessor. There is a mutuality of interest that must be
balanced in judging the lessee's actions. 17
B. The lessee who fails to prudently explore the premises has breached
the lease, and the lessor must put him in default as a precedent to an
action on the lease.
The courts consistently have rejected every contention that the in-
action or mere failure of the lessee to explore or develop the premises
results in a forfeiture or abandonment of the lease.' 8 The oft quoted
statement in Carter to the effect that the lessee must reasonably develop
the lease or give up the contract refers to the fact that the usual remedy
16. "When a mineral lease is being maintained by production of oil or gas, the
production must be in paying quantities ... ." Mineral Code article 124. "Therefore it
follows that the parties to the normal type of lease do not intend that the lease can be
maintained beyond the primary term by an amount of production which does not rea-
sonably hold out the prospect of making a profit on the lessee's total investment. .. ."
Comments to Mineral Code article 124. "The prescription of nonuse running against a
mineral servitude is interrupted by good faith operations .... By good faith is meant
that the operations must be (1) commenced with reasonable expectation of discovering
and producing minerals in paying quantities ... ." Mineral Code article 29.
17. See, e.g., Henry v. Ballard & Cordell Corp., 418 So. 2d 1334 (La. 1982). The
"prudent operator" test implicitly recognizes the contract of lease is one directed toward
commercial or economic development. Not only is the lessee not obligated to engage in
unprofitable activities, if he deliberately and knowingly does so he equally is outside the
limits of the contract and is acting in bad faith. Thus the lessee who continues to operate
a well that is not profitable is operating no well at all and the lease will terminate for
lack of production. See Mineral Code article 124 and the Comments thereto quoted above.
18. "Since the duty to develop is an implied obligation, the jurisprudence has con-
sistently held that a breach of this duty is passive and a formal placing in default is
required before judicial intervention may be sought. Trinidad Petroleum v. Pioneer Natural
Gas, 416 So. 2d 290 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982), writ denied, 422 So. 2d 154 (La. 1982);
Pipes v. Payne, 156 La. 791, 101 So. 144 (1924) .... Taussig v. GoldKing Properties
Co., 495 So. 2d 1008, 1014 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986).
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for the breach of the implied obligations is dissolution of the contract.
The cases and code plainly demonstrate that one is dealing with a breach
of contract, not a mere forfeiture clause. Furthermore, since it is a
breach of the contract, it must be shown that the lessee has taken some
action contrary to the lease or failed to do something he was obligated
to do before the court will declare the lease wholly or partially dissolved.
There is no evidence in the record that defendants' decision not
to attempt any further development in the shallow sands on
plaintiff's land was not a reasonable and justifiable decision on
the part of the lessees. There was no testimony either geological
or otherwise that anyone else considered it reasonable or prudent
to conduct any further developments .... Without reviewing
the evidence in more detail, we find plaintiff has failed to bear
the burden of proving defendants have not developed the leased
premises with reasonable diligence. 9
C. The burden of proving a breach of the obligation to explore the
premises is upon the lessor.
This principle is well established and actually appears to be based
upon two distinct considerations.20 The first is procedural. The burden
of proof is ordinarily upon the plaintiff alleging a breach of contract
by another. The second is based upon the nature of the lease itself.
The lessee is required to provide all of the capital and take all of the
risks of the venture. In most cases he will also receive benefits several
times greater than those inuring to the lessor if his efforts are successful.
Although the lessor contributes his land, he takes no risk and invests
no capital in the drilling. The lessee ordinarily has a greater interest in
developing the premises than the lessor, but unlike the lessor, must
temper his desires for profit by weighing the likelihood of loss. On the
other hand, the lessor, who has dedicated the mineral values of his
property to the lease, stands to lose nothing further if the venture fails.
The. courts have thus recognized that the judgment of the lessee, if
exercised reasonably and in good faith, is entitled to considerable weight,
and in case of honest doubt should prevail.
Where the lessee has conducted such operations in the past
at substantial expense and has evidenced an intention to continue
the development of the property or release the lease, the lease
is not necessarily subject to cancellation because of a difference
19. Saulters v. Sklar, 158 So. 2d 460, 463 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963).
20. "In any event the burden of proving grounds for the cancellation of a mineral
lease is on the lessor. Cox v. Cardinal Drilling Co., 188 So. 2d 667 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1966)." Frazier v. Justiss Mears Oil Co., 391 So. 2d 485, 486 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980).
See also Allen v. Horne, 478 So.. 2d 671 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985).
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of opinion with the lessors as to the proper amount of drilling-
activity required to constitute reasonableness.'
In Taussig v. GoldKing Properties Company," the court rejected a
claim that the lessee had breached the implied obligation to explore the
premises, and in doing so noted:
[Tihe cancellation of a lease is a harsh remedy not to be granted
without serious considerations. Those considerations which the
Court should make before pronouncing dissolution are: I) the
extent and gravity of the failure to perform, 2) nature of the
obligor's fault, 3) good or bad faith of the parties, and 4)
surrounding economic circumstances.23
D. The obligation to explore is not equivalent to a continuous drilling
obligation.
One of the most prevalent, but clearly erroneous, understandings
of the jurisprudence is the belief that the lessee somehow is obligated
to continuously or periodically drill wells upon the premises or suffer
a forfeiture of the lease. The error apparently arises from taking, out
of its proper context, the excerpt contained in the Carter opinion from
an Oklahoma opinion to the effect that "it is an implied condition that
the lessee will test every part of the premises." 4 The court in Carter
noted that it did not adopt the rationale of the Oklahoma case, but
merely used the opinion to rebut the argument of the lessee in Carter
that he had no obligation to explore the undeveloped portions of the
leased property. It is obvious from the portions of the Carter opinion
previously quoted that the court's reference to the Oklahoma decision
was not intended to define the lessee's duty as somehow being one that
required the lessee to drill wells over every part of the premises.2" It
was quite obviously intended to affirm that the lessee had a duty to
search for oil and gas over every part and reject the lessee's contention
that it had no obligation with respect to the undeveloped part of the
premises. It is clear that a lessee is not required to drill a well if there
21. Fontenot v. Austral Oil Expl. Co., 168 F. Supp. 36, 40 (W.D. La. 1958), modified
on other grounds, 266 F.2d 956 (5th Cir. 1959).
22. 495 So. 2d 1008 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986).
23. The statement is actually based on an earlier opinion of the second circuit in
Waseco Chemical and Supply v. Bayou State Oil, 371 So. 2d 305 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1979).
24. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
25. Cf. Allen v. Home, 478 So. 2d 671 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985). where the court
noted: "Here, appellants argue that the other independent drillers have offered to lease
and drill, but there was no evidence of firm commitments. Such allegations alone are
not sufficient grounds to reverse the judgment. .. ."
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is no reasonable prospect of profit sufficient to induce a prudent operator
to risk his capital.
26
From time to time the federal courts have interpreted Carter as
literally requiring that wells be drilled or the lease forfeited.2 7 The
Louisiana courts clearly have rejected this view and the jurisprudence
since Carter unequivocally holds that the mere failure to drill, or to
drill in any continuous pattern or with any particular frequency, does
not imply a breach of the obligation. In Middleton v. California Co.,8
the Louisiana Supreme Court observed:
Plaintiffs' position, on the other hand, seems to be that,
since there has been no actual drilling on any of these large
segments of land and, in fact, no new drilling operations since
1952, partial cancellation is necessarily in order. But this view,
we believe, overlooks the particular circumstances obtaining in
the case which show that Calco, throughout the years of the
lease, has conducted highly successful operations on the land
which have redounded to the common advantage of the con-
tracting parties and, before and since 1952, has continued its
explorations by making various tests and drilling, and by con-
tributing to the drilling upon adjacent property, all with the
view of securing new production from the leased land. 9
In Frazier v. Justiss Mears Oil Co.,30 the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals rejected a similar complaint by noting that, although the lessee
had not drilled upon the premises for several years, it had been and
was engaged in diligent and continuous efforts to identify and exploit
the mineral potential of the property and that those activities were all
that the lease required. In that connection the court said:
Several dry holes were drilled in the area before and after
plaintiff leased his property. Justiss-Mears [the defendant] drilled
many of these dry holes and participated in other dry holes....
It is shown that defendant has directly participated in the
drilling of 25 wells in the area, 16 of which have been farm-
26. In a somewhat related vein, it has already been noted that Article 29 of the
Mineral Code provides that a mineral owner who drills a well without a reasonable
expectation that it will produce in paying quantities is not using his rights in good faith.
The same thing would obviously be true of a mineral lessee.
27. See Romero v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 93 F. Supp. 117 (E.D. La. 1950)
and the recent case of Goodrich v. Exxon Corp., 642 F.Supp. 150 (W.D. La. 1986),
which, although purporting to follow the more recent Louisiana jurisprudence, still gives
evidence of a misunderstanding of its import.
28. 237 La. 1039, 112 So. 2d 704 (1959).
29. Id. at 1053, 112 So. 2d at 709.
30. 391 So. 2d 485 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980).
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outs. Only three of the 25 wells have proved productive ....
Plaintiff also overlooks the fact that ... the defendant
became aware of and began to participate in the preliminaries
of a play by a major oil company for one or more tests to a
much deeper, but unproven, depth in an area which would
include plaintiff's land, and for that reason declined to release
plaintiff's acreage. Defendant had participated in other deep
tests near this area at an earlier time. The drilling of a well to
the desired deep depth will cost more than $1,000,000. Defen-
dant's geologist said it would be desirable that the venturer who
conducted a deep test have about 6,000 acres in a bloc to make
the test and cost of production economically feasible....
Defendant's participation in the preliminary play to an even-
tual deep test in the area fulfills, under the circumstances pre-
sented, its obligation to diligently develop the leased property
as to unproven formations of greater depth."
No Louisiana court since Carter has held a lessee in default of his
obligations solely because he failed to drill a well on the premises within
some particular time.3"
E. The burden of the lessor can be met by showing that there is
reason to believe that diligent investigation of the leased premises might
disclose the presence of potentially profitable oil and gas deposits and
that the lessee refuses or has persistently failed to reasonably investigate
such possibilities, although it cannot be shown that a profitable well
could be drilled or even that the results of the investigation would be
favorable for development.
This principle actually is a corollary of the principle just discussed.
The mere failure to drill a well does not imply a breach of the obligation
to develop. Neither does the fact that the lessor cannot show that a
well should be drilled mean that the lessee has complied with his ob-
ligations. After all, the lessee, by agreeing to diligently develop the
premises as a prudent operator also is implicitly representing that he is
31. Id. at 486-88.
32. See, e.g., Wier v. Grubb, 228 La. 254, 82 So. 2d 1 (1955); Sohio Petroleum
Company v. Miller. 237 La. 1015, 112 So. 2d 695 (1959); Dawes v. Hale, 421 So. 2d
1208 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982); and Morrison v. D & L Partnership, 499 So. 2d 988 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1986). The only case remotely to the contrary, perhaps, is Vetter v. Morrow,
361 So. 2d 898 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978), in which the court upheld a finding of fact by
the lower court that the failure to drill on a unit formed by the commissioner and
encompassing a part of the leased premises was a breach of the lease. That case, however,
did not really involve the obligation to explore, but rather involved the obligation to
develop an existing reservoir. Furthermore, the lessee virtually admitted that a prudent
operator would have drilled the well, and attempted to excuse its failure to do so on the
ground that it was engaged in drilling elsewhere in the vicinity..
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knowledgeable concerning the industry and has the resources and ability
to find and produce mineral deposits if they exist on the land. Finding
oil and gas deposits is, of course, where the risk in the business lies
and where the expertise and willingness to invest capital is most critical.
To require the lessor to demonstrate that there is an oil and gas field
under his premises that can be profitably exploited before it can be said
that the lessee has breached his obligation to explore the premises is to
require the lessor to do the very thing that the lessee has agreed to do,
and to convert the lessee's obligation into one to drill wells where he
is directed to do so by the lessor, rather than to determine if the leased
premises justify such drilling."
The lessee customarily gets the lion's share of the production-from
three-fourths to seven-eighths of the total. The reason for this is that
he is supposed to do the work, provide the capital, and take the risk
of locating and developing the property for its mineral values. To require
the lessor to point out where the lessee ought to drill is to distort the
contract and the understanding of the parties as to their respective roles
as clearly and decisively as it is to say that the lessee must drill a well
on the premises to see if oil or gas is there, when no one experienced
in the industry and knowledgeable of the geology of the area would
risk his money in doing so.
The lessee is not a fiduciary-but he is supposed to find and produce
the minerals under the land if they are there. His obligation is greater
than that of merely drilling-it is to make those investigations and to
do those things that prudent oil men do when they are actively interested
in determining if oil and gas in commercial quantities exist under a
tract of land.
Courts have categorically rejected the view, occasionally advanced
by a lessee, that because he has discovered and developed mineral
deposits under portions of the leased premises, he is entitled to retain
the balance of the premises, abandoning any effort to investigate their
mineral potential and speculating on the hope that someone else may
develop data indicating the existence of other valuable mineral deposits
under the premises.
It is also obvious from the facts of Carter that the court's declaration
that the lessee must develop the premises with reasonable diligence or
give up the contract was not an attempt to define either the nature or
extent of the activities required of the lessee, but rather was a declaration
33. The lessee who attempts to excuse his failure to do anything toward the discovery
of oil and gas on the grounds that the lessor must show where a successful and profitable
well can be drilled is in the same position as a treasure hunter who obligates himself to
a landowner to diligently search the land for Jean Lafitte's hidden treasure in return for
3/4 of what he finds and then explains his failure to take any action whatsoever toward
locating the treasure by complaining that the landowner has not told him where it is.
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that a persistent refusal or failure to investigate the mineral potential
of the premises in the face of facts indicating that such an investigation
might lead to development is either a breach of the lease or tantamount
to an abandonment of a portion of the premises.
In Carter the lessee had discovered and was producing oil from a
reservoir on the up-thrown side of a fault crossing the premises. The
lessor introduced considerable evidence that the area across the fault on-
the down-thrown side might be productive, including the testimony of
a potential operator who averred that he would drill a well if given the
opportunity. The defendant, for a period exceeding ten years, had taken
the position that the area on its down-thrown side was non-productive
and that it had no interest in pursuing the matter.
Although the court obviously was impressed with the testimony of
the operator who said he would drill if he had the opportunity, it is
significant that the court never found, nor apparently believed it nec-
essary to find, that a reasonably prudent operator would drill a well
under the circumstances. A fair reading of the case indicates that in
the minds of the court, the breach was not in failing to drill, but rather
in the persistent and longstanding refusal of the lessee to take any steps
whatsoever to determine the mineral potential of the property in the
face of solid evidence that cause for such investigation existed.
[P]laintiffs made demand on the defendant for further devel-
opment or for cancellation of the lease, which was refused,
defendant taking the position that the property has been suf-
ficiently developed. The record does not disclose that defendant
has any present or future plans to develop this property further,
and the evidence convinces us, as it did the trial court, that
defendant has no intention of making any further develop-
ment....
The instant case, to say the least, is unique in our juris-
prudence, in that defendant to justify its refusal to develop
further the leased premises relies on the existence of a fault
which traverses the property, and on the testimony of two
reputable and well qualified geologists . . ..
These geologists do not in any way condemn the area of
the leased premises . . . the testimony given by one of them,
• . . is to the effect that the probabilities are against production,
although this area might produce. ...
In the 10 years or more during which this defendant has
had the property under lease, including the primary term which
expired on November 6, 1945, no effort has been made and no
steps taken to develop the property in any way ... nor has
defendant conducted geophysical work or made tests of any
nature in an effort to ascertain whether production could be
had therefrom ....
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Our analysis of all the testimony convinces us that defendant
herein has failed to develop sufficiently the 1263 acres covered
by the lease, . . . and that the reasons by which defendant
attempts to justify its refusal to develop the property further
are not adequate and sufficient, especially in view of the fact
that another competent and well qualified producer is willing to
drill to the north and east of the main fault line. In other
words, defendant has violated the implied condition of the lease
to develop the property prudently and reasonably.u
Virtually every case since Carter, that has found the lessee to have
breached the obligation to explore, has done so because the facts dis-
closed a persistent refusal to investigate the productive potential of
property, or a deliberate determination to abandon such efforts, in the
face of evidence that the area's mineral potential was not positively
condemned, not because the lessor proved a profitable well could be
drilled. In Wier v. Grubb," the court said:
The record shows that the drilling of the four wells was
confined within the far eastern terminus of the property, a
relatively small area in comparison with the entire acreage sub-
leased. It is also shown that other than the drilling and reworking
of said wells, there was no activity whatsoever in the mineral
development of the remaining area of this large acreage, nor
was there any activity which would evidence any intention on
the part of defendants to do so, from the time of the drilling
of the fourth well (a "dry hole") in 1944 until the filing of
this suit in 1946. The negative conduct of these defendants
constitutes, under our law, a violation of the specified and
expressed obligations, as well as the implied obligations of the
contract.3 6
More recently in Morrison v. D & L Partnership,7 the court ordered
a lease canceled, again citing the persistent refusal of the lessee to take
action to determine the mineral potential of the leased premises:
The defendant partnership did not have an expert witness.
Both partners testified. According to Long, [a partner] . . . [hJe
has wanted to sell the lease for quite a while. If they had more
investors they could afford to drill a salt-water disposal system,
but it would not be economically feasible to do so for one well.
34. Carter v. Arkansas La. Gas Co., 213 La. 1028, 1034-38, 36 So. 2d 26, 28 (1948).
35. 228 La. 254, 82 So. 2d 1 (1955).
36. Id. at 267, 82 So. 2d at 5.
37. 499 So. 2d 988 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986).
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He said that drilling depends on "economics and times," and
that if he had a six month lease it would be drilled during that
time and if a ten-year lease ". . . you drill what is necessary
and you drill it at a later time when you've got a better deal."
The partnership had no definite program for drilling but did
intend to drill more wells. Because they were having trouble
with the one well, they were not drilling any other wells. Ac-
cording to Dudley, [the other partner] ... they were doing
nothing with regard to the well except maintaining it with the
hope of getting more production. They were looking at other
properties for salt-water .... To drill another well, they would
need other partners....
The partnership members have been residents of Houston,
Texas. They have had local operators but their contact with the
actual working of the well has been limited. There is no overall
program for development of the whole leased premises. They
are awaiting a purchaser or other investors....
There was an admission that the partnership would only
drill what was necessary to keep the lease alive. They have not
tried to get back on the Flowers or Murphy salt-water disposal
systems. There are a number of wells in the immediate vicinity.
Most of them have access to salt-water disposal systems. De-
fendants have made no effort to use one of these systems. It
would cost only $13,500 to drill a well to the point of knowing
definitely whether it would be a possible producer or a dry
hole.38
On the other hand, in virtually every case since Carter in which the
court has found the lessee in compliance with his obligations to develop,
the court has emphasized that the lessee demonstrated it had made
diligent efforts to determine what reservoirs might exist under the prop-
erty and exhibited a willingness to develop those reservoirs that he might
discover and which in his judgment had economic potential. In doing
so, the courts have not only considered the extent to which the lessee
has drilled on the premises, but have placed equal if not greater im-
portance on his participation in drilling on nearby lands, on his con-
ducting geophysical and other geological activity, and in general, on the
totality of his efforts to determine the location of, and to develop where
justified, mineral deposits under the land.3 9
38. Id. at 992-93.
39. Middleton v. California Co., 237 La. 1039, 112 So. 2d 704 (1959); LeJeune v.
Superior Oil Co., 315 So. 2d 415 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975); Dupree v. Relco Exploration
Co., 354 So. 2d 1083 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978); Frazier v. Justiss Mears Oil Co., 391
So. 2d 485 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980); Allen v. Horne, 478 So. 2d 671 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1985); and Taussig v. GoldKing Properties Co., 495 So. 2d 1008 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986).
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VIII. SUMMARY
Since Carter, the courts have reiterated the well established principle
(now codified in Article 122 of the Mineral Code) that the ordinary oil
and gas lease contemplates that the lessee will develop and operate the
leased premises as a reasonably prudent operator for the mutual benefit
of himself and his lessor.
This has been interpreted to mean that the lessee implicitly agrees
to actively and diligently do what is customary and reasonable in light
of the circumstances to determine the probable occurrence of commercial
mineral deposits in the leased premises and to bring those deposits into
production in due course and when it appears reasonably possible to
do so profitably.
Louisiana courts have categorically rejected the view, prevailing in
many states, that for the lessor to prove a breach of this obligation he
must show that the lessee has failed to drill a well that a prudent
operator would have drilled-i.e., a profitable one. At the same time,
propositions that the obligation is equivalent to a continuous drilling
clause, or that there is any particular number of wells or a particular
time or period in which the lessee must drill on the premises to prevent
forfeiture of the lease equally have been rejected. The implied obligation
to reasonably explore and develop the premises is not a substitute for
either a continuous drilling clause or a so-called "Pugh" clause. Rather,
it is a recognition that the lessee has a continuing duty to diligently
investigate the mineral potential of the entire premises and to do those
things that an operator, knowledgeable of the industry, adequately fi-
nanced, and actively interested in finding oil and gas would do from
time to time in light of the knowledge and information currently available
to him. Seismic exploration, geological studies, participation in other
prospects, and attempts to procure others to drill marginally attractive
prospects through farm-outs and subleases are all things that prudent
operators do to discover potentially productive reservoirs under lands,
and things that the courts have recognized as being comprehended within
the obligation to investigate the mineral potential of the property.
As long as the lessee comports himself in the manner of a prudent
operator as described in the preceding paragraph and is otherwise pro-
ducing oil or gas in paying quantities, the lease continues in accordance
with its terms. If, however, it is proven that the lessee irrevocably
considers the premises or some part thereof to be devoid of minerals
in the face of evidence to the contrary, or if the lessee fails or refuses
to take action a prudent operator would take to reasonably determine
the mineral potential of the property, or if he otherwise persistently
fails or refuses to exercise diligent and serious efforts, in light of the
circumstances prevailing from time to time, to find oil or gas under
the leased premises, and if that neglect or refusal continues after he
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has been given proper notice under the terms of the lease, he will be
held either to have breached his obligation with respect to that part of
the premises, or to have effectively abandoned them, and the lease will
be terminated to that extent.
The extent of the development that has previously taken place, the
magnitude and nature of the lessee's expenditures in and around the
leased premises, and the size and complexity of the premises are relevant
in determining both the good faith of the lessee and the reasonabliness
of his actions. But no mechanical test or arbitrary program of drilling
can be substituted for the ultimate question required by Article 122-
whether the lessee conducted himself in a prudent manner for the mutual
benefit of both himself and his lessor.
The Mineral Code does not declare, nor do any of the cases in-
terpreting it hold, that a lease may be terminated or the lessee declared
to be in default as long as he is diligently conducting himself in the
manner described and the premises have some potential value which he
is, under the circumstances, actively interested in pursuing. Nor has any
case declared a lessee in default for failing to take some action, unless
the evidence shows that a prudent operator similarly situated would have
taken the action.
In the last analysis, the burden is upon the lessor to show, in some
particular manner, that the lessee has failed to perform his obligations
in good faith, or that he has somehow conducted himself in a manner
contrary to that of a prudent operator. A mere showing of a lack of
drilling or other exploratory activity, even for an extended time, is
insufficient. The lessor has agreed that the term of the lease will extend
for as long as the lessee produces and explores with diligence.
When leases are first negotiated and entered into, the lack of pre-
cision in defining the obligations of the lessee is usually justified for
the very reasons perceived in the Lanyon case-the parties simply do
not know what is likely to be encountered or what will be required to
develop the premises. Also, at this time the interests of both parties
are more or less in accord. The mere fact that the lessee is willing to
pay a bonus and delay rentals, or even go to the trouble of leasing the
land at all, usually indicates that he has some idea of the property's
potential, and that he will either drill on the property or abandon it
within a relatively short time.
Once the lessee has discovered oil or gas and has developed the
reservoirs, the interests of the lessor and lessee tend to diverge. The
lessor becomes confident that greater riches are awaiting him just across
the road from the last well or in the next pasture and becomes impatient,
not understanding why the lessee does not cover his land with wells.
On the other hand, the lessee, having taken an enormous risk and won,
may become less interested in taking such a risk again, unless the odds
are better and the returns more certain. Each becomes convinced that
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he is reasonable in his desires and that the other simply does not
understand the situation.
To succeed in his demands for a release, the lessor must produce
evidence that the possibility that oil and gas may be found under his
land is sufficient to cause a prudent operator to investigate it further.
The lessee who cannot then demonstrate that he is currently taking or
has recently taken some concrete steps to explore that possibility will
be presented with the following questions which he will be hard put to
answer: if the land may have additional mineral potential, why has he
not taken steps to bring it to fruition? If it does not, why is he so
intent upon preserving his lease? A mineral lessee has no right to conduct
any activities upon the land unless they are directed to the finding of
economic deposits of minerals. If he ever unequivocally admits that no
such minerals exist, then he has also admitted that his rights are irrelevant.
or have lapsed. If the lessee is to preserve his rights over non-productive
areas for any length of time, he must convince the court that he is
actively taking steps to develop them and that although someday they
may be productive, there is not yet sufficient evidence to justify his
expenditure of more effort or capital to do so than he currently is
doing.
On the other hand, the lessor who can produce no evidence that
minerals may be present under his land, or that there are steps that
someone reasonably might take to determine the existence of oil and
gas under his land, and who relies solely upon the supposed inaction
of the lessee will not and should not prevail. He must point to something
the lessee has failed to do-although it need not be the drilling of a
well.
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